I recently ended up reading Psychology of Intelligence Analysis from Richard Heuer, based on a compilation of declassified articles from the CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence, prepared for intelligence analysts and CIA directors. My previous post was about the analyst job in a series of posts that I try to lay down the most relevant lessons from the book.
Moving forward, one must grasp the whole to notice the missing parts. But if the whole isn’t visible, you likely wouldn’t have noticed the constellations drew in the above picture. Once they are noticed, they become obvious. And that’s what I wanted to talk about today.
Making Thinking Visible
- “Intelligence analysts should be self-conscious about their reasoning process.”
- “The analyst operates from a set of assumptions about human nature and what drives people and groups. Those are like to remain implicit in the analysis.”
- “The question is not whether one’s prior assumptions and expectations influence analysis, but only whether these influences are made explicit or remain implicit.”
- “One’s attention tends to focus on what is reported rather than what is NOT reported. It requires a conscious effort to think about what is missing but should be present if a given hypothesis were true.”
- “Assumptions are fine as long as they are made explicit in your analysis and you analyze the sensitivity of your conclusions to those assumptions.”
All of those excerpts from the book points to a single direction, which is the name of the topic I picked: make things visible (explicit). That should be the mantra. Acknowledging it is the first and so important step, but some tools should help the routine.
Writing is a topic I have already discussed here and I consider to be of the utmost importance. Sharing the research material previously with colleagues enriches the discussion and leaves time to other people criticize your thinking. Colleagues should not only read the material for the meeting, but also look up for complementary material that could reinforce or invalidate preconceived hypotheses. The ultimate step would be for the whole company to have a single investment thesis documenting the team’s work on the object company, not the lead analyst’s view on it.
Finally, when reviewing the material, always use two questions to check the rationale behind every assumption: “Is it? If so, why is it?” Those are brilliantly simple questions capable of enabling information sharing among team members and even debunking pseudo robust hypothesis.
I believe there’s much more to develop on this topic, but I believe those are a good first step in a profitable direction.
“Seeing should not always be believing.”